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Terrorism and
International Criminal
Law After the Military
Commissions Acts
Stephen I. Vladeck*
There is much that is compelling about Naomi Norberg's cogent discussion of
the relationship between terrorism and international criminal law, and of her
central thesis-that the two are actually quite a poor fit for each other.' For
starters, it strikes me as beyond dispute that many of the more heinous acts of
terrorism with which we are familiar are already prohibited under international
law-and even punishable in some cases in various of the international criminal
tribunals, particularly the International Criminal Court (ICC). 2 Thus, one may
* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. This article was
prepared in conjunction with the Santa Clara Journal of International Law's Symposium
on "The Future of International Criminal Justice," for my participation in which I owe
thanks to Beth van Schaack and David Sloss. Thanks to Nutan Patel for splendid research
assistance; thanks also to my co-commentators-Kathleen Dunn, Luz Nagle and Jordan
Paust-and especially to Naomi Norberg for providing such a thorough and thoughtful
platform for the conversation stimulating these papers. In the interest of full disclosure, I
should note that I have played a recurring role on the legal team in Hamdan, particularly in
the proceedings before the D.C. district court discussed herein. Needless to say, the views
expressed in this response are mine alone.
I. See Naomi Norberg, Terrorism and International Criminal Justice: Dim Prospects for a
Future Together, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 11 2010).
2. In particular, the ICTY has recognized (albeit not without controversy) that terror against a
civilian population is a war crime, and is therefore within that tribunal's jurisdiction. See
Prosecutor v. Gali, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, 1 86-138 (Dec. 5, 2003); see also
BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 555-72 (2007) (discussing Gali6). The ICC has
not yet reached the issue, although various scholars have argued that it would similarly be
able to exercise jurisdiction over terrorism as either a war crime or a crime against
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rightly question whether there is anything to gain, at least at the international level,
from creating a new standalone crime of terrorism. Further, I agree with Professor
Norberg that there is a danger that treating "terrorism" (however defined 3) as an
offense under international criminal law might undermine the significance of
international criminal justice for the more traditional "international" crimes going
forward. The broader the class of crimes that international criminal tribunals are
given the power to prosecute, the more we risk diluting the significance of the
crimes over which they have exercised jurisdiction to date.
That being said, Professor Norberg's article also suggests that defining
terrorism as a crime under international criminal law would negatively impact
human rights, because it would provide cover for states to adopt extraordinary
measures-including preventative detention and trial by military commission-in
the guise of preventing this international offense. As she writes,
[E]levating the status of terrorism from internationalized to international crime may have
the same effect as [various U.N. Security Council] resolutions: to incite states to take
increasingly harsh measures. Many of these measures limit fundamental rights to an extent
that may be considered disproportional; in some cases they lead to violations of the
prohibition against torture. ICC jurisdiction [over terrorism] could be interpreted as
approval of such measures, while, again, they have little in common with those taken to
combat the crimes already within its jurisdiction.
4
At least with regard to practice within the United States, I disagree. Instead, as I
argue in the short response that follows, the U.S. government's response to
September 11 has been remarkably indifferent to the actions that international
criminal law both countenances and proscribes. Where it finally surfaced,
international criminal law provided an important constraint on President Bush's
November 13, 2001 Military Order creating military commissions,' at least for the
plurality of the Supreme Court in Hamdan that concluded that conspiracy was not
recognized as a crime under the laws of war-and therefore fell outside of the
humanity. See, e.g., Lucy Martinez, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal
Court: Possibilities and Problems, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2002).
3. Jordan Paust's response provides a thorough treatment of the myriad problems of definition
(and a potential objective solution). See Jordan J. Paust, Terrorism's Proscription and Core
Elements of an Objective Definition, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 51 (2010).
4. Norberg, supra note 1, at 46.
5. See Military Order of November 13, 2001-Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
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authority for military commissions that Congress had conferred.6 Moreover, and as
importantly, I believe that intemational criminal law could yet provide similar
constraints on the scope of the offenses Congress made punishable by military
tribunals in the Military Commissions Acts of 20067 and 2009 (which I will refer
to simply as "the MCA"),8 at least to the extent that international criminal law is
clear.9
Thus, while I agree with Professor Norberg that there are a host of reasons why
terrorism may today be a poor fit for international criminal law, my own view is
that the U.S. experience stands in important and marked contrast to her article's
suggestion that acceptance of terrorism as an international crime might tacitly
condone domestic derogation from human rights norms in terrorism cases. U.S.
practice since September 11 suggests, to the contrary, that international criminal
law has prompted such departures only to the extent that the U.S. government has
been able to exploit that body of law's proscriptive ambiguity in subjecting non-
citizens detained as "enemy combatants" to trials by military commission. For that
reason, clear acceptance or rejection of terrorism as an offense under international
criminal law would--or at least should-have the same basic effect on domestic
practice: to limit the ability of individual countries, including the United States, to
decide for themselves which individuals and offenses can be subjected to the
extraordinary processes of military commissions.
Part I introduces this argument by tracing the use of military commissions in the
United States from before September 11 to Hamdan, demonstrating the relatively
constraining role international criminal law played throughout. In Part II, I turn to
Congress's post-Hamdan reincarnation of military commissions through the MCA.
As the military commission's decision denying Hamdan's post-MCA motion to
6. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 601-04 (2006) (plurality opinion) [hereinafter
Hamdan I]. Justice Kennedy did not join Justice Stevens's opinion on this point, which he
believed was unnecessary to resolve. See id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
7. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18,
and 28 U.S.C.).
8. As this response was in production, Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574-614 (codified in scattered
sections of 10 U.S.C.). The 2009 MCA rewrites most of the relevant provisions of the 2006
MCA, albeit in ways that are largely immaterial to the discussion contained herein-since
the relevant provisions of the 2009 MCA mostly re-codify the same language as the 2006
MCA.
9. See Stephen I. Vladeck, On Jurisdictional Elephants and Kangaroo Courts, 103 Nw. U. L.
REV. COLLUQUY 172, 178-80 (2008).
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dismiss illustrates,' 0 international criminal law's lack of clarity has been as
significant to the scope of Congress's power as the specific content of ICL's
corpus juris.
Finally, Part II suggests how greater clarity on the part of international criminal
law would in turn impose substantive constraints on the ability of the U.S.
government to broadly define both the personal and subject-matter jurisdiction of
military commissions, focusing on the (underappreciated) constitutional limits on
Congress's power under the Offenses Clause. 1 As Part I concludes, if we
reinvigorate the extent to which the Constitution imposes international law-based
limits on Congress's regulatory power, then clarity, rather than scope, would
become the critical concern in assessing the viability of terrorism as an offense
under international criminal law-and that clarity would come from international
consensus, rather than American political deliberation.
I. ICL and the Pre-MCA Military Commissions
A. Pre-9/11 U.S. Military Commissions and the Laws of War
As has been well-documented, various forms of military commissions have
been employed by the United States dating back to the Founding. 12 And in its
controversial 1942 decision in Ex parte Quirin,13 the U.S. Supreme Court gave
legal sanction to a military commission established by President Roosevelt to try
eight Nazi saboteurs, relying on an ambiguous provision of the Articles of War as
providing statutory authority for the trials. That provision-Article 15-appeared
to contemplate that military commissions could exercise jurisdiction over offenses
and offenders triable by military commission under the laws of war, 14 and the
10. See Ruling on Motion to Dismiss (Ex Post Facto) and Defense Request to Address
Supplemental Authority on D012, United States v. Hamdan, No. D012 (Mil. Comm'n. July
14, 2008).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (empowering Congress "[tlo define and punish... Offences
against the Law of Nations").
12. For one of the most detailed modem overviews, see LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS
AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2005).
13. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
14. As Article 15 then provided, "the provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon
courts-martial shall not be construed as depriving military commissions ... or other
military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by
statute or by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions ... or other
military tribunals." See id. at 27.
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Quirin Court had little difficulty concluding that Congress had the authority to so
provide. 15 As Chief Justice Stone explained for the unanimous Court,
From the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the
law of war as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the
conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy
individuals. By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress has
explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals
shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in
appropriate cases. Congress, in addition to making rules for the government of our
Armed Forces, has thus exercised its authority to define and punish offenses
against the law of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the
jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons for offenses which, according to
the rules and precepts of the law of nations, and more particularly the law of war,
are cognizable by such tribunals.1
6
As for the specifics, i.e., whether the eight saboteurs were triable under the laws
of war for their alleged offenses, the Court was unequivocal:
our Government has ... recognized that those who during time of war pass surreptitiously
from enemy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the
commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, have the status of
unlawful combatants punishable as such by military commission. This precept of the law
of war has been so recognized in practice both here and abroad, and has so generally been
accepted as valid by authorities on international law that we think it must be regarded as a
rule or principle of the law of war recognized by this Government by its enactment of the
Fifteenth Article of War.
17
Significantly, then, Quirin read the Articles of War to authorize military
commission jurisdiction coextensive with that recognized by the laws of war.
15. Quirin thus seemed to limit the Court's 1866 decision in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2 (1866), which had otherwise been understood to bar military tribunals where the
civilian courts were open and their process unobstructed. For a thorough treatment of the
relationship between Milligan and Quirin, see Carlos M. Vazquez, "Not a Happy
Precedent": The Story ofEx parte Quirin, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 219 (Judith Resnik
& Vicki Jackson, eds., 2009).
16. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27-28 (footnote omitted).
17. Id. at 35-36 (footnote omitted). In the footnote to this passage, Chief Justice Stone cited to
a host of foreign authorities and authoritative scholarship in support. See id. at 35 n.12. To
be fair, some have suggested in recent years that the offenses the saboteurs were convicted
of committing were not nearly as well-established under international law as the Quirin
Court suggested. See, e.g., Vazquez, supra note 15. But at the very least, the Court saw
international law (whether correctly applied or not) as providing the outer limits on the
commission's authority.
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Thus, whether individuals could properly be tried by a military commission turned
on whether they were an offender triable under international law for an offense
recognized as a war crime by international law. The laws of war thereby provided
the outer constraints on the jurisdiction of military commissions, a point the Court
would reiterate repeatedly in their other post-war military tribunal cases.18 As a
result, when Congress in 1950 re-codified Article 15 as Article 21 of the new
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), it re-confirmed Quirin's reading.
B. ICL and the November 2001 Military Order
Two months after the September 11 attacks-and relying heavily on a broad
reading of Quirin advanced by the Department of Justice's Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC)19-President Bush promulgated a "Military Order" authorizing the
Secretary of Defense to create military commissions to try non-citizens detained as
"enemy combatants" for offenses to be defined by the Secretary.20 As authority,
the order invoked the President's 'constitutional authority as commander-in-chief of
the military, along with three statutes: the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF), pursuant to which Congress had authorized the use of force against those
responsible for the September 11 th attacks), and Articles 21 and 36 of the UMCJ. 21
18. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1946) ("[Congress] incorporated, by
reference,. . . all offenses which are defined as such by the law of war, and which may
constitutionally be included within that jurisdiction. It thus adopted the system of military
common law applied by military tribunals so far as it should be recognized and deemed
applicable by the courts, and as further defined and supplemented by the Hague
Convention, to which the United States and the Axis powers were parties."); see also
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 354-55 (1952) ("The 'law of war' in that connection
includes at least that part of the law of nations which defines the powers and duties of
belligerent powers occupying enemy territory pending the establishment of civil
government.").
19. See Legality of the Use of Military Commissions To Try Terrorists, Memorandum from
Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel for the
President (Nov. 6, 2001) (on file with author), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/200 1/pub-millcommfinal.pdf.
20. See Military Order, supra note 5. Specifically, section 4(a) of the order provided that "[a]ny
individual subject to this order shall, when tried, be tried by military commission for any
and all offenses triable by military commission that such individual is alleged to have
committed . I.." d. § 4(a), at 66 Fed. Reg. 57,834.
21. See id. pmbl., at 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833.
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Acting under the order, President Bush designated six unnamed detainees for
trial by military commission in July 2003.22 The first formal charges were not
revealed until over a year later, when Salim Hamdan was charged with the crime
of "conspiracy. '23 Hamdan brought a pre-trial habeas petition challenging the
legality of the tribunal on a number of grounds, including, as relevant here, that his
tribunal's procedures violated Article 36 of the UCMJ, 24 and that, because
"conspiracy" was not recognized as a war crime under the laws of war, his trial
was not authorized by Article 21 of the UCMJ. Although Hamdan prevailed in the
district court, 25 the D.C. Circuit reversed, concluding, inter alia, that Hamdan
lacked any rights that his trial by military commission could violate.26 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari,27 and ultimately concluded that the commissions
created by the Military Order were indeed unlawful.
28
C. Hamdan and the ICL-Based Limits on Military Jurisdiction
Although Justice Stevens's opinion in Hamdan is long and complex, 29 the
specific constraints on military jurisdiction derived from the laws of war were not
addressed until near the end-and in a part of the opinion (Part V) not joined by
22. See Press Release, Dep't of Defense, President Determines Enemy Combatants Subject to
His Military Order (July 3, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
releases/2003/nr20030703-0173.html.
23. See Dep't of Def., Military Commission List of Charges for Salim Ahmed Hamdan,
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20O40714hcc.pdf. The elements of
"conspiracy" were detailed in "Military Commission Instruction No. 2," a regulation
promulgated by the Secretary of Defense. See 32 C.F.R. § 11.6(c)(6) (2005); see also
Crimes and Elements of Trials by Military Commission, 68 FED. REG. 39,381 (July 1,
2003).
24. Article 36 then required that "[a]ll rules and regulations made under this article shall be
uniform insofar as practicable," 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000), which was understood to require
that military commission procedures resemble those employed for courts-martial except
where it would be impracticable for them to do so.
25. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004).
26. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
27. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 546 U.S. 1002 (2005) (mem.).
28. See Hamdan 1, 548 U.S. at 601-604.
29. I have discussed the majority's jurisdictional analysis and its analysis of the separation-of-
powers issue elsewhere. See Stephen 1. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief and
the Separation of Powers After Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 933
(2007) (separation of powers); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Increasingly "Unflagging
Obligation ": Federal Jurisdiction After Saudi Basic and Anna Nicole, 42 TULSA L. REv.
553, 557-58 (2007) (jurisdiction).
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Justice Kennedy.30 Writing for a four-Justice plurality, Justice Stevens explained
that:
There is no suggestion that Congress has, in exercise of its constitutional authority to
"define and punish... Offences against the Law of Nations," positively identified
"conspiracy" as a war crime. As we explained in Quirin, that is not necessarily fatal to the
Government's claim of authority to try the alleged offense by military commission;
Congress, through Article 21 of the UCMJ, has "incorporated by reference" the common
law of war, which may render triable by military commission certain offenses not defined
by statute. When, however, neither the elements of the offense nor the range of permissible
punishments is defined by statute or treaty, the precedent must be plain and unambiguous.
To demand any less would be to risk concentrating in military hands a degree of
adjudicative and punitive power in excess of that contemplated either by statute or by the
Constitution.31
As Stevens went on to explain, "The crime of 'conspiracy' has rarely if ever
been tried as such in this country by any law-of-war military commission not
exercising some other form of jurisdiction, and does not appear in either the
Geneva Conventions or the Hague Conventions-the major treaties on the law of
war." 32 Rejecting the government's arguments based upon U.S. law to the contrary,
the plurality concluded by emphasizing that "international sources confirm that the
crime charged here is not a recognized violation of the law of war, '33 invoking the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and subsequent decisions of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in support.34 For
the Hamdan plurality, then, international criminal law thereby provided an
important constraint on the jurisdiction of military tribunals, at least based upon
the authority that Congress had thus far conferred.35
30. See Hamdan I, supra note 6 at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (explaining why he
viewed it as unnecessary to reach the validity of the conspiracy charge).
31. Id. at 601-02 (plurality opinion) (citations and footnotes omitted).
32. Id. at 603-04 (footnotes omitted).
33. Id. at 610.
34. See id. at 610-11 & n.40.
35. To be sure, Justice Thomas devoted a substantial part of his dissent in Hamdan to his
opposite conclusion on the validity of the conspiracy charge. See id. at 689-705 (Thomas,
J., dissenting). But my point here is not to take sides as between the plurality and the
dissent; rather, it is to show how, at least for the plurality, the laws of war provided a
constraint on-rather than tacit support for-the jurisdiction of the military commissions.
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II. ICL and the Military Commissions Acts of 2006 and 2009
In their separate concurrences in Hamdan, Justices Kennedy and Breyer both
invited Congress to provide the statutory authority for military commissions that
the Court had found lacking,36 and Congress did not disappoint. On October 17,
2006, President Bush signed into law the Military Commissions Act,37 which
included a host of controversial provisions-most prominently the jurisdiction-
stripping provision subsequently invalidated by the Supreme Court (at least as
applied to the Guantdnamo detainees) in Boumediene.38
The core of the 2006 MCA, though, was section 3, which provided wide-
ranging statutory authority for trials by military commission. Specifically, 10
U.S.C. § 948d(a) under the 2006 MCA provided that "A military commission
under this chapter shall have jurisdiction to try any offense made punishable by
this chapter or the law of war when committed by an alien unlawful enemy
combatant before, on, or after September 11, 2001." And § 948a(l) defined "alien
unlawful enemy combatant" as, inter alia, "a person who has engaged in hostilities
or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United
States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a
person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces). 3 9 As Ryan
Goodman has explained, "emerging international standards appear to prohibit the
prosecution of indirect participant and nonparticipant civilians before military
tribunals [with exceptions not here relevant]., 40 Thus, while the first clause of
§ 948a(1) seems untroubling, the second clause raises the very distinct possibility
36. See, e.g., Hamdan I, supra note 6, at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Where, as here, no
emergency prevents consultation with Congress, judicial insistence upon that consultation
does not weaken our Nation's ability to deal with danger. To the contrary, that insistence
strengthens the Nation's ability to determine-through democratic means-how best to do
so."); id. at 636-37 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) ("This is not a case . .. where the
Executive can assert some unilateral authority to fill a void left by congressional inaction. It
is a case where Congress, in the proper exercise of its powers as an independent branch of
government, and as part of a long tradition of legislative involvement in matters of military
justice, has considered the subject of military tribunals and set limits on the President's
authority.").
37. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, supra note 7.
38. See id. § 7; see also Bournediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Al Maqaleh v. Gates,
604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding section 7 of the MCA unconstitutional as
applied to three non-citizens detained at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan).
39. 10 U.S.C. § 948a(l)(A)(i) (2006) (emphasis added).
40. Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 48, 59
(2009).
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that individuals who are (at most) indirect participants in hostilities might still be
subjected to trial by military commission.'
A. The MCA and Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
In addition to its overbroad definition of who could be tried by military
commissions, the 2006 MCA also codified twenty-eight separate substantive
offenses triable by military commissions.42 Before defining the specific crimes,
though, the statute set forth as its "purpose" to "codify offenses that have
traditionally been triable by military commissions. This chapter does not establish
new crimes that did not exist before its enactment, but rather codifies those crimes
for trial by military commission., 43 And to reinforce the point, the next subsection
(new 10 U.S.C. § 950p(b)) provided that "the provisions of this subchapter... are
declarative of existing law," and so "do not preclude trial for crimes that occurred
before the date of the enactment of this chapter."44 These two provisions seem
particularly curious given that, in addition to traditional war crimes, both the 2006
and 2009 versions of the MCA include as substantive offenses the crimes of
"terrorism," 45 "providing material support for terrorism, '46 and, notwithstanding
Hamdan, "conspiracy.,
47
The MCA thereby raises two interrelated questions: Does international law
provide substantive limits on Congress's power to define the offenses that are
triable by military commission? Even if not, may Congress define such offenses
retroactively? When Hamdan was re-charged under the MCA with committing the
crimes of "conspiracy" and "providing material support to terrorism," both sets of
questions came to the forefront, first via a pre-trial habeas petition seeking to
enjoin his trial. This time, though, the D.C. district court concluded that it should
abstain from deciding Hamdan's claims until after his trial took place.48 Hamdan's
41. See id. at 60-63 (discussing the inappropriateness of including indirect participants within
the scope of the "enemy combatant" definition).
42. See 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b) (2006). For the 2009 version, see 10 U.S.C. § 950t (2010).
43. Id. § 950p(a) (2006). For the 2009 version, see 10 U.S.C. § 950p(d) (2010).
44. Id. § 950p(b).
45. Id. § 950v(b)(24). The 2009 version moves terrorism to § 950t(24).
46. Id. § 950v(b)(25). For the 2009 version, see § 950t(25).
47. Id. § 950v(b)(28). For the 2009 version, see § 950t(29).
48. See Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D.D.C. 2008).
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constitutional arguments were thus left for the trial court, or for a post-conviction
appeal.49
B. Hamdan II and the Constitutional Limits on Military Jurisdiction
In a pre-trial motion to dismiss, Hamdan re-asserted his claims that Congress
could not subject him to trial by military commission for conspiracy or providing
material support to terrorism. In denying Hamdan's motion on the eve of his trial,
the trial court issued a six-page decision focusing entirely on the Ex Post Facto
Clause claim-i.e., on whether Hamdan had been charged with offenses that were
not recognized as being triable by military commission at the time they were
committed. Judge Allred's answer was somewhat tautological: Invoking the
assertion in § 950p that the offenses were not new crimes, he concluded that
In light of Congress's enumerated power to define and punish offenses against the law of
nations, and its express declaration that in doing so, it has not enacted a [sic] 'new crimes
that did not exist before its enactment,' the Commission is inclined to defer to Congress's
determination that this is not a new offense. There is adequate historical basis for this
determination with respect to each of these offenses.
50
In other words, because Congress specified in § 950p that it was only clarifying
existing law (and not defining any new crimes), the offenses by definition could
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.5'
Perhaps more significantly, Judge Allred's opinion seized on the extent to
which international law was unclear as to whether conspiracy and material support
were triable by military commissions. Quoting from a 2000 district court opinion,
he appeared to agree that, "provided that the acts in question are recognized by at
least some members of the international community as being offenses against the
law of nations, Congress arguably has the power to criminalize these acts pursuant
49. As I've explained elsewhere, at least some aspects of Hamdan's claims implicated his right
not to be tried by a military commission acting without jurisdiction, a right that, by
definition, cannot be vindicated post-trial. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Jurisdiction, the
Right Not To Be Tried, and the Suspension Clause After Boumediene, 16 No. I HUM. RTS.
BRIEF 6 (2008).
50. See United States v. Hamdan, supra note 10, at 6.
51. Leaving aside the obvious grammatical problems with the passage, the legal analysis is
unconvincing on its face, since the "historical basis" on which the commission relied was
the very evidence the plurality in Hamdan had found insufficient. Even if Congress could
provide that conspiracy would be triable by military commissions prospectively, it could
not invalidate the plurality's analysis nunc pro tunc.
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to its power to define offenses against the law of nations., 52 That is, so long as
international law is unclear as to the precise scope of offenses and offenders triable
by military commissions, deference is owed to the political branches. The negative
implication, though, is that Congress would have less leeway where international
law's limits were more precisely defined.
C. The Offenses Clause and the Problem ofAmbiguous International Law
To be sure, no Article III court has yet had to grapple with the assumption
undergirding my thesis-that the laws of war, as part of the law of nations, provide
the outer bounds on Congress's power to supplant civilian courts with military
commissions. 53 At least until the MCA, the question could never have arisen, since
the upshot of the Quirin Court's analysis was that Congress had only authorized
what the laws of war allowed. Now that Congress has appeared to sanction military
jurisdiction in excess of that which is accepted practice under international law, it
becomes a question of first impression-and one that may well have pressing
significance going forward.
If the Offenses Clause does provide the outer limits of Congress's power to
supplant the civilian courts with military commissions, then that suggests that
clarity is as significant as scope, because the political branches will have less
ability to subject to trial by military commission offenses that have not already
been identified as such by the international community.
This leads, then, to my central concern with Professor Norberg's article. The
status quo-leaving terrorism undefined-would only provide further support for
analyses such as those undertaken by Judge Allred. Finding scattershot examples
in both American and international practice, Congress would be able to derogate
from civilian trial norms in any number of instances where international law may
not be clear. In contrast, were the contours of international law more precise with
52. United States v. Hamdan, supra note 10, at 5 (quoting United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F.
Supp. 2d 189, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
53. In a forthcoming article, I attempt to prove this assumption, or at least to provide the
strongest arguments in support thereof. See Stephen t. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a
Constitutional Limit on Military Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y (forthcoming
2011). The closest support comes from Quirin itself. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28
(where Chief Justice Stone noted that, through Article 15, "Congress has explicitly
provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have
jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases."). For
the opposite view, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power To Interpret
International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1774, 1820-21 (2009).
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respect to the offenders and offenses triable by military commission, Congress's
power "to define" would become increasingly circumscribed.54 And if international
law clearly prohibited treating conspiracy as a war crime, I suspect that Hamdan's
post-MCA proceedings may have come out quite differently.55
Conclusion
Hard questions remain with regard to the future of terrorism under international
criminal law, and my colleagues in this symposium are probably better situated to
answer those questions than I am. But I believe we can extrapolate two related
principles from the specific context of U.S. military commissions after September
11: proscriptive ambiguity provides flexibility for military commissions to try
offenses and offenders who might not actually be triable under the laws of war,
whereas clarity might well constrain the ability of the political branches to deviate
from accepted international law norms. Of course, if clarity in this context meant a
consensus international definition of terrorism as a war crime, that would
empower-rather than prohibit--domestic jurisdictions to apply that definition in
military commissions. But at least then, such a result would be the product of
international agreement and deliberation, rather than state-by-state derogation
grounded as much in domestic politics as in fundamental principles of international
law.
54. Indeed, this is the very paradox of the Offenses Clause. As Justice Story wrote in 1820,
"Offences ... against the law of nations, cannot, with any accuracy, be said to be
completely ascertained and defined in any public code recognised by the common consent
of nations.... [T]here is [thus] a peculiar fitness in giving the power to define as well as to
punish; and there is not the slightest reason to doubt that this consideration had very great
weight in producing the phraseology in question." United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 153, 159 (1820). At the same time, it seems abundantly clear from the record of the
Constitutional Convention that the grant of power to "define" was limited to clarifying the
state of international law, rather than perverting it.; See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Federalism
and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power "To Define and Punish ... Offenses Against the
Law of Nations," 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 447, 472-73 (2000) (discussing the record of
the Constitutional Convention that the grant of power to "define" was limited to clarifying
the state of international law, rather than perverting it).
55. As it is, Hamdan was ultimately convicted and sentenced to a surprisingly short prison term
(given that it included the duration of his pre-trial detention). At the end of his sentence, he
was repatriated to Yemen, where he is free today.
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